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Russia today presents potentially lucrative business opportunities and markets for any 
company interested in expanding internationally.  Together with the opportunities and potential 
profits, however, Russia also presents formidable challenges and risks to any Western or American 
company considering doing business there.  The purposes of this thesis are:  to explain how 
Russia’s unique and tortured history has impacted the business culture of modern Russia; to 
describe the primary business risks that any Western company entering Russia will face; and to 
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The impact of national history and culture on doing business in Euro-Asia, Russia in 
particular, is widely recognized among American managers. Many of them find that the significant 
differences between Russian and Western cultures make the functioning of multinational 
companies in Russia more difficult. This paper will examine the impact of historical and cultural 
traditions on the business norms and behaviors among Russian business people. Moreover, this 
paper will provide guidance and broad recommendations to Western companies planning to 
successfully enter the emerging Russian market.  
This thesis is divided into three sections. The first section presents a historical overview. 
This overview demonstrate that Russia’s long and tragic history has influenced the development 
of a “survival mentality” and certain patterns of business behavior. The second section describes 
the obstacles that Western companies can expect to face when entering Russian marketplace. 
Finally, the third section provides business recommendations and approaches to successfully 







2. RUSSIA THROUGHOUT HISTORY 
2.1. The Russian Empire 
The vast territory known as Russia today has been known historically by different names, 
including Rus, Kievlan Rus, Tsardom of Muscovy and the Russian Empire. Until 1917, Russia 
was a monarchy with rulers known as tsars. Russia’s history is long and tragic. Russians have 
suffered at the hands of invaders, but also at the hands of their own rulers (Wilson & Donaldson, 
1995). Most Russians know their history well and proudly tell others about their motherland’s 
victories and sacrifices. A deep understanding of Russian history is essential for Western partners 
to understand and navigate the governmental bureaucracy, frequently changing laws and evolving 
social structure of the country.  Western business ventures in Russia are advised to understand this 
history and its influence on the challenges of engaging in business in Russia’s emerging 
marketplace. 
From the eleventh to the fourteenth century, Russia was relatively undeveloped and 
disengaged from European innovations. Though it was considered a European country, Russia did 
not have access to navigable seas, nor did it have abundant productive soils, a long agricultural 
growth season or a large population of workers per square mile.  Therefore, Russia had more 
obstacles to economic growth than many of its European counterparts.  Western innovations 
usually reached Russia after a lag of several centuries. In agriculture, the three-field system, 
widespread in Europe by the ninth century, became the dominant agricultural form in Russia only 
at the end of the seventeenth century.  
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In addition to slow agricultural innovation, government and private institutions also 
developed more slowly than Russia’s European counterparts. As a result, many of Russia’s biggest 
cities (such as Novgorod, Pskov, and Kiev) were not major centers of commerce until the twelfth 
century. 
In the thirteenth century, Russia began strengthening economic and cultural interaction 
with the rest of Europe. Then, the Mongol Empire, with a brutality rarely witnessed in history, 
invaded Russia and destroyed major cities, including Moscow, Ryazan, Kiev, and Kolomna. After 
three years of resistance, all Russian states were forced to submit to Mongol rule and tax burden, 
and became a part of the Golden Horde Empire. This lasted until the fifteenth century. Large tribute 
payments to Mongols drained money from the country, destroyed many commercial centers and 
delayed economic growth in Russia. The invasion also diminished Russia’s position on the 
international stage. Weakened by the Mongol attacks, Russia lost control of the important Dvina 
River trade route and the Western territories in the west of Lithuania and Sweden which led to the 
erosion of Russia’s international power. (MacKenzie, 1999).  
The Mongol invasion of Russia also influenced the language and the form of government. 
Even though Russia never completely lost its European heritage and influence, the political and 
social systems of Russia were significantly affected by the Mongol invasion. In some ways, Russia 
became a more Asiatic nation, particularly in terms of governmental policy; but its deep Christian 
roots helped maintain a strong cultural link with Europe (Hosking, 2001).  
After the bloody and burdensome Mongol period, it took several decades for the economy 
to begin to rebound. Indeed, during the next four centuries, even during periods of substantial 
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economic growth, there were always substantial lags in socioeconomic development in Russia 
compared to other European countries. Economic and cultural growth in Russia would have 
proceeded more rapidly if peace had prevailed in the country for a prolonged period. As Petr 
Stolipin, one of Russia’s prime-ministers, stated: “Give Russia twenty years of external and 
internal peace and it will change beyond recognition” (Yanov, 2012, p.5).  Unfortunately, that 
never happened. Between 1700 and 1940 Russia fought in 34 wars and in 392 battles. Every war 
resulted in millions of people being killed and the destruction of numerous Russian cities. 
In the seventeenth century, during the reign of Peter the Great, Russia became one of the 
leading European powers. After winning access to the Baltic Sea, Peter the Great founded one of 
the most beautiful European cities, Saint Petersburg, and moved the Russian capital from Moscow 
to St. Petersburg. Peter also promoted education and the Enlightment.  He replaced some of the 
traditionalist and medieval social and political systems with systems that were modern, 
westernized, and scientific. Foreign know-how and technology were prized. Despite the distaste 
most Russians felt for “heathen foreigners,” the Russian government employed numerous foreign 
engineers, craftsmen, military advisors and others at high salaries and with good career 
opportunities in Russia.  This was an effective strategy to transfer knowledge from the highly 
trained foreign employees to eager Russian apprentices (Wilson, Donaldson, 1995).  
Peter’s main goal was to get Russia involved in the diplomatic and military affairs of 
modern Europe. Catherine the Great followed Peter and continued these efforts, but with a focus 
on exposing Russia to Western educational methods. During the reigns of Peter and Catherine, 
western advisors and business people arrived in Russia in increasing numbers. Many young 
Russians were sent abroad to study and bring back their knowledge to serve their country.  
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By the eighteenth century much was changing in Russia. French was used more than 
Russian in upper-class households. As Russians learned how to read French, German, and English, 
they became familiar with the ideas of Western philosophers. Catherine the Great’s reign, often 
called the Catherinian Era, is considered the Golden Age of Russian Nobility. It is quite clear that 
the reforms of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries had a long, positive impact on 
Russian society.  
In the eighteenth century, after Napoleon’s unsuccessful invasion campaign, the Russian 
Empire had the third largest population in the world. Russia extended from the Arctic Ocean in 
the north to the Black Sea in the south, and from the Baltic Sea in the west to the Pacific Ocean in 
the east. Demographically, it remained heavily rural with low productivity on large estates worked 
by serfs, who were peasants irrevocably tied to their landlords, until they were freed by Alexander 
the Second in 1861. Despite its progress, however, Russia embarked on modern economic growth 
two generations after most European countries. Hence, the weaknesses found in domestic 
entrepreneurship in Russia are directly related to the country’s history, and hindered Russia’s early 
development (Gaidar, 2012).  
In the nineteenth century, the government realized that the financial and military strength 
of the country could only develop with more proactive economic initiatives. Proactive economic 
policies of those years included protectionism in terms of high tariffs which led to high consumer 
prices for goods and services within the country.  
The government also faced risk factors that increased the probability of the tsarist 
regime’s collapse. In the rural areas peasant dissatisfaction was rising due to the unfair distribution 
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of land which eventually led to the upheavals of 1905-1906. Moreover, Western European political 
organizations and civil societies were evolving. Western European governments guaranteed 
individual and political rights and expanded suffrage (Gaidar, 2012). The European model 
undermined the Russian model of an enduring absolute monarchy in the eyes of the educated 
population (Mitchell, 1998). At that time, socialist ideas became popular and had a strong influence 
on people who had no opportunity to take an active part in public politics. The tsarist regime, 
however, was inflexible; it could not implement in an orderly manner the deep reforms that were 
necessary (Gaidar, 2012). 
2.2. “Iron Curtain”, The Era of Bolsheviks 
November, 7, 1917 is a date deeply engraved in history. It marks the death of the old 
tsarist regime and its replacement by the Bolsheviks. In March 1917, revolution broke out on the 
streets of Saint Petersburg and Tsar Nicholai Romanov, the last tsar of Russia, was forced to 
abdicate the throne. That November, the radical socialist Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, seized 
power and established the world’s first communist state. But for Lenin, Nicholai was still a major 
problem. The tsar, appointed by God, had many loyal followers. Many Russians considered 
Romanov, while alive, to be the legitimate ruler of Russia. Therefore, Lenin decided to get rid of 
the tsar and his family. 
After a secret meeting in Ekaterinburg, where the tsar’s family was held, the Bolsheviks 
decided to sentence them to death. Late on the night of July 16, Nicholai, Alexandra, their five 
children and four servants were awakened and ordered to dress quickly and go down to the 
basement of the house where they were being held (Rosefielde, 2007). They were told to arrange 
in two rows for a picture to be taken to quell rumors that they had escaped. Suddenly several armed 
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gunmen burst into the room and shot the servants and the entire imperial family. Those who were 
still breathing were stabbed to death (Kushnirsky, 1982). The remains of Nicholai, Alexandra and 
three of their children were found and positively identified in a forest near Ekaterinburg in 1991. 
Alexey and Anastasia, the other two Romanov’s children, were believed to have survived the 
execution. The execution of tsar Nicholai’s family was the end of the Romanov’s three-century 
reign in Russia.  
 The reason the Bolsheviks resorted to such extreme measures was to ensure total 
compliance by the people to the will of the government. The Bolshevik ideology led to a radically 
different form of government than previously experienced under the tsars. Soviet Bolsheviks 
ideology was based on Marxist social theory. According to Marx, a socialist society was the first 
step to communism. The term “transition society” was used to emphasize the temporal differences 
between the socialist and communist stages. Socialism requires only a short period of rapid growth 
in order to achieve Communism, supposedly, the highest form of productivity and morality.  
The Marxist social theory of communism describes collective labor as a fundamental 
social and moral value. All social relations should be based on collective labor and high social 
consciousness for the mutual good of society. The essential condition for moral progress to the 
Bolsheviks was a complete elimination of the market economy, status differences, and private 
property rights with communal labor being at the top of mutual good. Collective enrichment was 
deemed superior to any individual activity and personal motivation. Communist ideology claimed 
that a man working for himself was an egoist, a disgrace, someone who could not live in a 
communist society (Wilson & Donaldson, 1995). 
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Communist philosophy was the major influence on ethics in Russia. For over 60 years, 
managers operated in a centrally planned economy where virtually no judgments regarding ethical 
behavior were considered.  The government mandated who, what, where, when and why as to how 
all business practices were conducted.  For all the communist years, Russian business men and 
women had no significant moral discretion to exercise other than to “obey” or “disobey”.  
Accordingly, Russia suffers from an undeveloped moral or ethical code for commerce.   
In 1962 the communist ideology was distilled into a 12-point moral code serving as a 
guide for loyal communists. The code, however, failed to control the behavior of the communist 
elite, who were among the first to violate it; they justified their actions by rationalizing that the 
end result would justify the means. The regime created no incentives to work hard or take personal 
responsibility for one’s actions. Power and privileges were the exclusive rights of those who were 
loyal to the party; therefore, party loyalty was more important than the 12-point moral code.  
Lack of freedom, lack of opportunity, centralized dictatorship, and oppression of 
individual expression created a passive population that placed little value on individual 
accomplishment or entrepreneurial activities. Laws and edicts were dictated by the Communist 
authorities with little opportunity for impartial resolution dispute, and no opportunity for a trial by 
jury (Puffer & McCarthy, 1995). A plethora of meaningless and contradictory laws governing 
business, and no independent judiciary, made the laws easy to circumvent.  Widespread violations 
of these laws left them virtually impotent to regulate business; the priority for business remained 
focused on the achievement of goals set by the Communist government. 
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One of the most devastating consequences of Communism in the Soviet Union was the 
total destruction of all competition for power. Virtually every institution was owned and run 
strictly by the state, and no single business, farm, church, newspaper, or voluntary organization 
competed during the reign of communism. By the end of the 1980s it was evident that the 
communist model had failed. A flawed ideology with corrupt and immoral leaders, a lack of 
personal realization, a defunct economy and empty grocery store shelves led to the inevitable 
conclusion that communism is dead.  
2.3. Capitalism Arrives  
In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev started the process of Perestroika, referred to as a complete 
rebuilding of economic and political systems. The goal of Perestroika was to bring the Soviet 
economy up to par with Western European countries by introducing reforms. The most significant 
of Gorbachev’s reforms in the economic sector allowed foreigners to invest in the Soviet Union 
through joint ventures (Gaidar, 2012). In the political sector, Gorbachev democratized the system 
by launching Glasnost, which literally means openness. Glasnost encouraged inclusion of the 
populace in the political process, and allowed freedom of expression. The initiative that had the 
most far-reaching effects was Gorbachev’s decision to abandon Soviet control of the communist 
nations of Eastern Europe. He declared that all nations should be free to choose their own course 
without outside interference. In 1989, Communist regimes fell in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Gorbachev’s reforms partially decentralized the 




Hard-line communists attempted to remove Gorbachev from power in 1991 by staging a 
coup. The revolt failed due to the efforts of Boris Yeltsin, who emerged as the country’s most 
powerful political figure. On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned from the presidency, 
handing over control to Yeltsin. One day later, on December 26, 1991, Yeltsin and other reformers 
formally dissolved the Soviet Union. That day the Soviet Union flag was lowered from the Kremlin 
for the last time and replaced with the Russian Flag. 
Yeltsin announced an economic reform program that would become known as “shock 
therapy” (Pirani, 2010). The main elements of his plan included abolishing price controls, making 
the ruble convertible at market rates, liberalizing trade, and privatizing state property. Yeltsin 
appointed Egor Gaidar and Anatolii Chubais, known as the founders of market institutions in 
Russia, to push through the “shock therapy” reforms.  
Yeltsin’s market-oriented “shock therapy” had some negative effects, including a 
decrease in real wages, the rise of corruption, and rapid inflation produced by price liberalization. 
Privatization was a major enabling factor in the rise of organized crime, known as “Mafia” and 
corruption.  Mafia had the ability and financial resources to acquire state companies and 
enterprises. In 1994, a report for President Yeltsin stated that 80 percent of private banks and 
businesses had to pay 10 to 20 percent of their revenues to organized crime coalitions (Kotz & 
Weir, 2007: 178). The Mafia presence in the society was very visible and violent. Gang-style 
executions were common; 120 bank employees, including 15 directors, were killed and 780 arson 
attacks were made on banks in 1993 alone (Grealy, 2010).  
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Although the radical changes of “shock therapy” were not as successful as the reformers 
had hoped, in the long run they generated more important and wide-spread positive results. In the 
economic context, Russia began to emerge as a strong economic power. By eliminating high tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions the government encouraged international trade and foreign investment 
in Russian economy. Many multinational Western companies, with their superior marketing and 
financial power, entered Russian markets, thereby creating incentives for local companies to be 
more competitive and produce more efficiently. The ruble, the domestic currency of Russia, was 
made fully convertible - that is, anyone holding them would be free to exchange them (Grealy, 
2010). By August 1996, monthly inflation dropped from the January 1992 peak of 245 percent to 
close to zero. Exports were rising-from about $54 billion in 1992 to about $88 billion in 1996, and 
Russia ran a $28 billion trade surplus in 1996 (Russian Economic Trends, 1997). Perhaps most 
impressive, “shock therapy” also succeeded in calming the fears of those who worried that 
communism would rise again. The “shock therapy” approach effectively sealed the coffin on the 
communist past.  
Clearly, “shock therapy” was radical, but in the long term, it was the most beneficial 
approach the government could enact. 
2.4. From Yeltsin to Putin 
On 31 December of 1999 Boris Yeltsin announced his resignation, leaving the presidency 
in the hands of his successor-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Putin, a former KGB agent, was the 
President of Russia from 2000 to 2008. Then, from 2008 to 2012, he served as the Prime Minister 
and was reelected as President in 2012.  Although Russia was formally headed by Dmitriy 
Medvedev (President from May 2008 to 2012), Vladimir Putin was the most influential leader 
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during that time period. During Putin’s first premiership and presidency (1999-2000), Russia’s 
economy was rapidly growing, real incomes rose by a factor of 2.5, while real wages more than 
tripled (Sakwa, 2007). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by about 68 percent from 2000 to 
2008. Putin’s first presidency was marked by a rise in living standards; average wages rose more 
than fivefold (Pirani, 2010). The high-profile improvement in living standards is one of the primary 
reasons why (in electoral terms) Putin has been one of the most popular presidents in recent history.  
Many economists and politicians identify Putin’s past in the KGB as the key to his 
successful achievements. While his background in the main security agency of the Soviet Union 
played a significant role, the 2000s commodities boom, increases in world oil prices, and the 
progressive reforms of Egor Gaidar were probably the major catalysts for the economic progress 
of the period.   
Russia has always been one of the largest energy producing countries in the world and is 
heavily dependent on the export of oil and natural gas for revenue. Natural resources account for 
65-70 percent of total exports and account for half of the federal budget. The Russian government 
relies on the export of oil and natural gas to an unhealthy degree. It fails to address other economic 
weaknesses, specifically the poor state of agriculture, and the lack of machine-building and 
processing industries. Economists dispute whether Russia is prone to what they call the “natural 
resource curse,” a situation in which abundant natural resources produce short-term benefits, such 
as big export revenues during periods of skyrocketing prices, but potentially damages long-term 
economic development (Pirani, 2010). 
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Although the oil boom improved living standards overall in Russia, it also widened the 
gap between the rich (oligarchs) and the poor, leaving Russia as one of the world’s leaders in 
inequality in income and property distribution. The State Statistics Service’s Funds Coefficient, 
an indicator that measures the richest against the poorest segments of the population, indicates that 
the rich continue to grow richer while the poor remain more or less in the same position (Balmforth, 
2013). From 1995 to 2011, the coefficient was steadily increasing. Furthermore, from 2009 to 
2013, the capital of Russia (Moscow) held the title as the billionaire capital of the world.  Eighty-
four of the world’s richest people, whose combined wealth is over $366 billion, called the Russian 
capital their home in 2013. This tiny group of multi-billionaires control up to 40 percent of the 
nation’s wealth, and these statistics may understate the problem because the rich are notorious for 
taking their wealth out of the country or keeping their savings out of the banks and therefore off 
the radar. This problem has no simple solutions. Economists point to the need for more political 
and market competition, enforcement of property rights, the rule of law, systemic change in labor 
market institutions and stronger social protection for the ones in need (Parfitt, 2011). In the 
meantime, analysts say nothing has been done to narrow the gap that continues to grow.  
The political system in Russia during the periods of Putin’s presidencies is often called 
Putinism. From the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was viewed as one of the 
most important test countries for a transition to democracy. During Boris Yeltsin’s presidency 
(1991-1999), most Western and American academic specialists regarded Russia as a democracy 
and believed that Russia was in an early stage of transition, with some imperfections that did not 
negate the fundamentally democratic character of the political regime (Evans, 2010). However, 
within a few years after Vladimir Putin’s presidency began, many analysts began to refer to the 
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political system as authoritarian because former military and security officers brought into 
government (called “Siloviki”) took control of much of the political and economic power (Hahn, 
2004). Stephen Whitefield noted that, under Putin, there is an “increasing consensus among 
scholars, journalists, and policy-makers in the West” that the Russian political regime has moved 
“significantly off a democratic pathway,” (Whitefield, 2009, p.93). Considering both the 
undemocratic features and the components of democratic pluralism remaining in Russia, it is fair 
to call the existing political system in Russia “semi-authoritarian”. 
In a semi-authoritarian political regime, democratic rights such as freedom of speech, 
freedom to organize, and freedom of assembly are no longer recognized. In respect of freedom of 
speech, Putin’s rule began with the campaign to bring the national television stations under state 
control. Doing so ensured that only sanitized news reached most Russian households, thereby 
safeguarding Putin’s electoral majority (Pirani, 2010). The widespread emergence of the Internet 
has made the situation better for those seeking alternative sources of news. On the other hand, 
freedom of the press has also been undermined by closing down or taking control of some of the 
most outspoken newspapers, such as Segodnya and Kommersant.  
Russia’s record of murdered journalists is worse than that of any country except Iraq and 
Algeria; between 1993 and 2008, 81 journalists died doing their job; 40 more were killed under 
suspicious circumstances and 13 disappeared (Pirani, 2010). In October 2006, international 
attention focused on the murder of Anna Politkovskaya. Politkovskaya was a human rights activist 
and, the heroic writer for Novaya Gazeta about the war in Chechnya. After a five-year trial, three 
men were sentenced to prison, two of them for life. Nevertheless, it remains unclear who ordered 
or paid for the murder of Anna Politkovskaya and several other prominent investigative journalists. 
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3. RISKS IN THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
Although Russia is struggling to evolve into democracy with guaranteed freedoms for its 
citizens, the emerging Russian market is still enticing to both American and European businesses. 
However, the unstable political and economic environment creates uncertainties for companies 
considering Russia as a market for their goods and services. Yet, the size of the market and the 
potential for international expansion are tempting.   
Of all of the challenges facing Russia, perhaps none is more complex than reducing 
corruption and strengthening the rule of law. Corruption has often been identified as a major source 
of problems. Corruption is perceived to be considerably greater in Russia than in Poland, Brazil, 
India, and China, on par with Ukraine, but less than in Venezuela or Uzbekistan (Aslund, Guriev 
& Kuchins, 2010). Given Russia’s highly educated populace and relative wealth, its level of 
corruption is surprising. One explanation is that while corruption and weak support for the rule of 
law impose significant costs on society at large, they also produce concentrated benefits for 
powerful constituencies within Russia. It is critical to recognize the underlying political nature of 
the problem. Each sweetheart tax deal to companies owned by relatives of powerful state officials, 
each government contract directed to the major political party supporters (United Russia) rather 
than to the best qualified firm, and each call from a governor to a judge to decide a case in a 
supporter’s favor is enabled by political capital that incumbents are loathe to abandon (Aslund, 
Guriev & Kuchins, 2010). 
It seems a herculean task to combat corruption in a country where, apparently, no 
institution or agency is free from it. As a result, it has become an accepted view that the Russian 
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economy is non-transparent - that is, it is an economy where the “rules of the game” are not easily 
understood (Ledeneva, 2001). The “rules of the game” can be understood, however, if one knows 
and takes into account the so-called unspoken rules and unwritten policies. There is a common 
saying in Russia: “V Rossii zakon - vse ravno, chto dishlo, kuda povernul , tuda i vishlo” (one law 
for the rich and another for the poor). It is not that the components of the rule of law lack 
transparency; rather, the ability of the law to function coherently has been subverted by a powerful 
set of informal practices that have evolved in Russia. Tax evasion is one of the many examples 
that illustrate how unspoken rules operate. There are many informal and commonly known ways 
of reducing tax liability and evading taxes; this is detrimental to the efficient functioning of the 
economy (Ledeneva, 2001). On the other hand, “saved” taxes are oftentimes used to reinvest in 
the economy.  
A popular folk saying, “Do not have a hundred rubles, but have a hundred friends,” 
illustrates another striking example of unspoken rules - the phenomena of “blat” and informal 
systems of networking. The word “blat” is practically impossible to directly translate into English. 
It is commonly referred to as the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain goods 
and services in short supply and to find a way around formal procedures (Ledeneva, 1998). “Blat” 
networks include personal, occupational, and educational ties in the allocation of resources. Blat 
is widely used in the spheres of state education and employment. Most of the prestigious and well-
paid jobs are only obtained by acquaintance, even where the market trends are supposed to take 
over (Ledeneva, 1998). American and other Western companies working in Russia put a lot of 
effort into resisting blat employment, but often with no success. Some enterprising Western 
companies, however, manage to turn blat relations to their advantage. One of the chocolate 
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factories in Samara provides a good example. Since being privatized by Nestle, it has become one 
of the most sought out companies to work for. One has to have a connection to obtain a job there 
- either a relative working there or an influential person already employed. One of the main goals 
of the company was to make the factory somewhat similar to a family-run business; therefore, the 
top management implemented a policy of hiring only by recommendation. They created a waiting 
list of all relatives of their workers, with their credentials, who were interested in employment with 
the company. When a vacancy arose, the most qualified candidates from the list were invited for 
an interview. As a result, employment by blat was rationalized and institutionalized into a 
somewhat formal and recognized procedure. The informal and blat networks ensure trust and 
reduce hiring risks. Therefore, blat networks are indispensable in a variety of contexts in today’s 
Russia. Understanding the constructive effects of blat can help Western companies overcome its 
negative implications. The fundamental issue, however, remains how to deal with a society in 
which loyalty to one’s connections means more than loyalty to the state and where unwritten codes 
and social conventions dominate the law (Ledeneva, 1998).  
Despite Russia’s uncertainty and instability in many aspects of the economy, it still 
represents attractive business opportunities for Western companies. A survey among 42 U.S.-
based companies conducted by Puffer (1996) revealed some interesting findings. The chosen 
companies ranged from small businesses to Fortune 100 corporations. Four of them were just 
preparing to enter the Russian marketplace. The 38 firms that had already established themselves 
in Russia entered the market in the following ways: with a local partner (16), directly (10), through 
a broker or facilitator (8), or with a Western (or American) joint venture (4). Despite the inherent 
riskiness of foreign business activities in Russia, only four respondents evaluated the success of 
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their firms as poor. The majority rated their companies’ success as either “good” or “very good”, 
while eight rated it as only “fair” and three reported achieving excellent results. As these overall 
evaluations illustrate, business ventures in Russia have been relatively favorable for most 
companies.  
This does not mean, however, that there are no obstacles or risks. To get an overall 
assessment of the risks, the survey asked two general questions. First, respondents were asked to 
rate the uncertainty of the business environment in Russia on a 4-point scale. The 19 respondents 
judged the business environment as being highly uncertain and risky, while 21 evaluated the 
conditions to be somewhat uncertain and moderately risky. Only two described the environment 
as having either low or little risk. “Only put in what you can afford to lose. Decide up front what 
you want- profits, market share, and the like,” advised Erich Zarnfaller, Senior International 
Treasury Analyst at EG&G, Inc., the Wellesley, Massachusetts provider of environmental 
management services and manufacturer of radiation and security devices. Added Kathy Crecelius, 
a Vice-President at BayBank in Boston: “The former USSR presents … great risk. However, for 
those with ethnic and linguistic ties to the C.I.S. countries, with solid business experience and 
capital to invest- and risk, there are now opportunities” (Puffer, 1996, p.217). 
The second general question was related to the role of the government of Russia and its 
attitude toward American companies entering the marketplace. The 12 firms rated the host 
government as being supportive of their efforts, and 17 evaluated it as neutral. Furthermore, six 
respondents were in their first year of business activities in Russia; therefore, they had limited 
exposure to the government officials. Seven firms did find the government to be a major obstacle 
to doing business. One of them was Intertech International Corporation, a Boston-based firm 
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whose Austrian subsidiary was involved in a joint venture to install air conditioning systems in 
new constructions. One of the managers, Richard Saint-Amant, provided insight into the complex 
web of bureaucracy existing in the former Soviet Union. First, the Russian Embassy in Washington 
D.C. refused to provide work visas based on a letter from the Russian partner. The Russian 
Embassy in Vienna, home of Intertech’s joint venture partner, however, did find the letter 
sufficient to provide work visas. Nevertheless, in an attempt to send air cargo to the Black Sea via 
Moscow, Intertech lost six weeks waiting for bureaucrats in Moscow to “locate” the shipment.  
To help understand the extent of the major risks and obstacles that companies face doing 
business in Russia, the respondents were asked to rate nine specific risks on a 5-point scale from 
“no risk” to “extreme risk.” The identified areas of greatest risk were political instability (3.6), 
lack of infrastructure (3.6), and the lack of laws protecting business interests (3.5). Difficulties in 
obtaining supplies and raw materials were also rated as a serious risk (3.2). Other risks, considered 
to be less serious, included undeveloped financial markets and institutions (2.8), lack of suitably 
experienced partners (2.7), difficulty repatriating profits (2.5), work force issues (2.5), and 
corruption and bribery (2.1). We will discuss each of these issues separately. 
3.1. Political instability 
Given Russia’s frequent change of political regimes, political instability was noted by 
many respondents as an important source of risk. Western and American companies are simply 
afraid to invest their money into an unstable political environment. The political environment can 
affect the economic environment, thereby impacting companies’ profit margins and bottom line. 
Nevertheless, Peter Hemingway, Program Director of Russia Operations at Polaroid Corporation 
in Cambridge, Massachusetts believes that it pays to be patient: “We still have hopes Russia will 
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emerge as a major trading partner in the international environment. The current problem is lack of 
focus on where they are going” (Puffer, 1996, p.218). Despite the political risks, the Russian 
market is full of potential and foreign companies willing to take risks can exploit the potential 
found there.  
3.2. Lack of infrastructure 
Most of the physical infrastructure is highly undeveloped in Russia. The transportation 
system is inadequate for conducting business efficiently. “Lack of distribution,” insisted Henry 
Quinlan, President of BosMosco, a Boston-based company marketing food, sporting and medical 
goods in Russia, “presented a tremendous opportunity to create our own distribution system. The 
entire retail and wholesale network is rising from nothing” (Puffer, 1996, p.219). Recently, 
however, this issue is less of a major problem because the physical infrastructure has been 
developing rapidly. According to the Business Monitor’s forecast (2014), infrastructure 
development in Russia is the most important component in order to unlock its economic growth. 
Furthermore, their data illustrates that over the last 10 years the construction sector has been 
playing a far more significant role in the overall economic output in the emerging Russian 
economy. Between 2004 and 2007, the construction sector’s contribution to gross domestic 
product (GDP) was approximately 5.4-5.5%. Moreover, preparations for the 2018 World Cup 
prompted the government to increase its spending on new infrastructure projects, including new 
transport investment and commercial construction.  
3.3. Lack of laws governing and protecting business interests 
Arguably, one of the most important barriers for entry into Russia is the lack of laws or 
weak laws governing and protecting businesses. Furthermore, many of the existing laws are vague 
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and can be interpreted in multiple ways. As previously discussed, laws tend to be applied 
selectively as local authorities see fit. According to another study conducted by Radaev (2002), 
over 70 percent of entrepreneurs in Russia experienced broken contracts. Consequently, weak 
institutions combined with vague, inconsistently applied laws result in the chronically weak rule 
of law in Russia. This sense of lawlessness affects domestic and international companies alike. In 
another survey of 50 major foreign companies investing in Russia (McCarthy, 2001), 24 of them 
estimated their annual losses from intellectual property violations to be at least one million dollars.   
Moreover, there are some laws and regulations from the Soviet Union era that are still in 
force. As a result, it is sometimes unclear and quite confusing which regulations apply in a specific 
case. In fact, “No one really knows which laws and regulations are implemented and observed, 
although it is clear that many are not implemented at all, or only partially” (OECD, 2005, p. 5). 
Given the current situation, “Entrepreneurs fear bureaucrats more than criminals” (Smolchenko, 
2005, p. 1). It is not surprising that all these factors combined form barriers for Western companies 
attempting to learn Russian laws and prepare action plans. 
3.4. Difficulty obtaining supplies and raw materials 
This issue generated the most disagreement among the people polled in the survey 
conducted by Puffer (1996). The majority of respondents claimed that obtaining supplies and raw 
materials was not a problem. These respondents represented service firms involved in banking, 
consulting, and sales and distribution activities that did not rely on Russian suppliers. A near equal 
number of respondents said the issue presented “some,” “much,” or “extreme” risk. These 




3.5. Undeveloped financial markets and institutions 
With little money available from the few existing lending institutions in the former Soviet 
Union, obtaining financing for business ventures has proved to be difficult. American companies 
are reluctant to back businesses in such an unstable environment. As BayBank’s Kathy Crecelius 
claimed, “US banks will not be committing their capital for a long time, and rightly so” (Puffer, 
1996, p. 219).  
3.6. Lack of suitably experienced Russian partners 
In Puffer’s survey (1996) most of the respondents rated this obstacle on the less risky end 
of the spectrum. It reflects that some companies entered the marketplace directly, without any 
assistance from their Russian counterparts or third party brokers. Other companies who had 
established business relationships with their Russian partners expressed satisfaction with them. 
This group included companies such as Baird Corporation, which had been approached for a joint 
venture by a firm in St. Petersburg. Overall, relationships initiated by the Russian side have become 
fairly common.  
Some of the issues associated with finding appropriate partners in Russia included 
filtering the opportunities that were presented, and ensuring that those making claims and promises 
are capable of backing them up. Ralph Sherman, Corporate Counsel at Innovatech International, 
Inc., a stainless steel manufacturer in Lexington, Massachusetts, added “filtering opportunities” to 
the list and rated it among the most extreme risks (Puffer, 1996). Ernst & Young, a prominent 
international consulting and accounting firm, also reported to have issues in screening potential 
partners and opportunities on behalf of several clients.  
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3.7. Difficulty repatriating profits 
Repatriation of profits did not rank among the highest risks. Some companies, including 
Nyrpo Corporation and Intertech, stated that it did not represent any problems for them. Nyrpo, a 
Massachusetts based company that manufactures molded plastic products through a joint venture 
in Moscow, earned their profits in the local currency-rubles. Conversely, Intertech’s representative 
stated: “If somebody really wants to buy, they will find a way to pay in hard currency” (Puffer, p. 
220). Nevertheless, some of the firms indicated that repatriation of profits was one of the major 
concerns while conducting business in Russia. Given the fact that the emerging economy of Russia 
has been growing at a rapid rate over the last few years, it is not surprising that the government 
takes initiatives to encourage Western companies to reinvest their revenues rather than sending 
them back to the home country.  
3.8. Work force issues 
According to Puffer’s survey (Puffer, 1996), work force issues did not present a lot of 
risks according to the respondents. A few, however, ranked this problem as having “much” or 
“extreme” risks. To further understand this important issue, I referred to a Meirovich and Reichel 
(2000) study regarding American and Russian employees. According to it, there is a cross-cultural 
conflict that demonstrates the differences in the norms and practices of the two groups. For 
example, Russians do not always support the basic American concept that “the customer is always 
right”. Another workforce problem that American managers face is the workers’ mentality formed 
under the system of the total centralization. They are looking for instructions from the boss in 
every situation even when they can be in charge of the decision-making process. Clearly, they are 
not used to delegation of responsibilities, decentralized decision-making, and initiatives of middle 
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managers. Therefore, cultural values and norms of the majority of Russian workers still adhere to 
the socialist economy ideology.  
Another study conducted by Beekun et al. (2003) explored how U.S. and Russian 
employees differ in evaluating what constitutes ethical behavior and what does not. Respondents 
were given scenarios and were asked to make their decisions based on ethical judgements. The 
study concluded that U.S. employees have stricter guidelines when it comes to assessing ethics. 
Furthermore, the researchers discovered that ethical assessments varied widely with different 
scenarios. There was a significant correlation between scenario type and national cultures. 
 American stance towards ethics is clear; the U.S. passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act more than a decade ago, and the U.S. Department of Justice has been actively pursuing 
violators. Russia’s tumultuous history and unique culture, however, have contributed to less 
certainty among Russian employees about what constitutes ethical business behavior.  
Moreover, unlike their American counterparts, Russian managers and employees have 
very vague ideas about business honesty, bribery, proprietary information, etc. Such differences 
in approach create misunderstandings. A Western company entering the Russian marketplace may 
find it advantageous to hire local employees, but the potential risks involved due to different ethical 
standards must be taken into consideration. As previously discussed, the significant differences in 
cultural norms, values and ethics cannot be underestimated. 
3.9. Corruption and Bribery 
Surprisingly, in the survey by Puffer (1996) most companies had not been exposed to 
corruption and bribery. In a more recent interview (Hsu, 2005), however, the executives of 
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international companies doing business in Russian ranked this issue among the most important 
ones. Furthermore, this study showed that networks between companies and government 
bureaucrats seem to be indispensable to survive and grow in the Russian marketplace. When 
starting a business, some companies were given a choice of the “slow way in” without payoffs or 
“fast track”, with the associated corrupt payments (Karhunen & Ledyaeva, 2012). Thus, investors 
from non-corrupt countries view corruption and bribery as one of the key barriers of entry into the 












4. THE FLAVOR OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN RUSSIA 
4.1. An improving marketplace 
Clearly, there are considerable obstacles that Western companies face doing business in 
Russia. Lately, however, Russia has been making significant progress toward improving its 
investment climate, as shown by the most current data from The Doing Business report. The Doing 
Business report evaluates over 180 countries on 10 criteria, such as ease of opening a new business, 
ease of securing a construction permit, access to the distribution infrastructure, registration of 
ownership rights, ease of securing loans, protection of investors' rights, tax payments, and a 
country's role in international trade. According to the 2013 annual report, Russia has significantly 
improved its business climate by climbing 20 positions to the 92nd place. Two years earlier, in 
2011, Russia climbed four places, and it improved its position in the 2012 rating from 120th to 
112th place (Interfax, 2013). Hence, Russia has been becoming a more business-friendly country. 
Moreover, Western companies are willing to pursue opportunities in the face of significant risks 
in this ever-changing and potentially productive market. 
According to a 2012 report from the non-profit International Research and Exchanges 
Board and the U.S.-Russia Foundation, several major US-based companies have a large presence 
in the country. PepsiCo was the first American company to enter the Russian market in 1974 
(Rocco, 2014). Over the last 40 years, the company has created more than 30,000 jobs and invested 
more than $3 billion in Russia. General Motors and Ford manufacture cars in Russia, while 
Caterpillar and John Deere have several plants that build their respective equipment. Operations 
in Russia produced $1.7 billion in revenues in 2014 for John Deere. Even though that is less than 
five percent of John Deere’s total revenues, it is still significant. John Deere is represented by 70 
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dealers and has two factories and two offices in Russia. IBM, Microsoft and Apple also have a 
large presence in the country. Mars Inc. entered the Russian market in 1991 and it has recently 
built its second chocolate factory. Procter & Gamble opened its first Russian unit in 1991, and it 
has become one of the largest players in the consumer goods segment.  Boeing and Chevron have 
a large presence in the market also. Most of these companies faced some of the obstacles discussed 
earlier. Nevertheless, they managed to overcome them and become major players in the Russian 
economy.  
4.2. Coca-Cola: A Model for Success 
Coca-Cola is among the most successful companies in Russia. Coca-Cola entered Russia 
after the collapse of the socialist regime. It began by selling Fanta prior to the introduction of Coca-
Cola in 1985. When Coca-Cola was introduced to Russia, the company had only a small presence 
in comparison to PepsiCo, which by that time had established a strong position in the bottled drink 
industry. The situation soon changed due to an innovative strategy initiated by Coca-Cola 
management in 1990 (Rolfe & Woodward, 1997). At that time Russian economic and political 
situations were uncertain. Soft drinks companies still reported to the State Agricultural Industry 
Committee, a vestige of the socialist past, and, therefore, a large investment carried a large 
potential risk for the company. Nevertheless, Coca-Cola’s executives made the decision to expand 
rapidly and widely in Russia. They gave the company’s representatives in Russia a mandate to 
establish an entire and complete system of production, marketing and distribution centers 
throughout Russia all within six months.  
One of the most critical tasks for top management was to establish open channels of 
communication with government officials and to persuade them that the production, marketing 
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and distribution systems would indeed work and would generate millions of dollars in revenues 
over the long term. The next obstacle they faced was finding the land to build the first factory. It 
turned out to be a longer process than they had initially anticipated. However, in building the first 
Coca-Cola factory in Russia Coca-Cola truly became a pioneer. In 1991, they were the first 
American company to lease land from any government in Russia. They had to explain to the 
Russians what a lease was. This process took longer in Saint Petersburg; where it took over 30 
months just to get all the necessary approval documents from the local government. Furthermore, 
St. Petersburg could not provide the basic infrastructure for the first plant. Coca-Cola had to make 
a deal with government authorities, whereby it received tax rebates that covered capital costs for 
infrastructure development.  
Innovation and flexibility were hallmarks of the company’s investment strategy (Rolfe & 
Woodward, 1997). Coca-Cola expanded in Russia through different entry models, such as joint 
ventures, building new plants in place of old, refurbished ones. In addition to direct investments 
by Coca-Cola, its other investment partners have invested in Russia as well, including the Inchcape 
and Leventis Groups (conglomerates from the United Kingdom), and EFES (Turkey). These 
companies helped Coca-Cola expand its facilities beyond Moscow and St. Petersburg. 
When Coca-Cola decided to locate in Russia its strategy implementation began by 
building the basic infrastructure for soft drink production (home office, plants, and distribution 
channels). In the first phase, the major challenge was to be able to meet customer demand. In the 
second phase the strategy focused on developing an extensive distribution network and 
establishing a supplier base that would ensure high quality while containing costs.  
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Finding reliable and flexible suppliers for raw materials and components was critical to 
Coca-Cola. According to Michael O’Neil (Rolfe & Woodward, 1997, p. 3), the Coca-Cola 
manager in Russia, a key strategy to overcome the internal barriers that hindered other investors, 
was to get their production and distribution infrastructure established locally as quickly as possible. 
This was not always been easy; simple supplies like glass bottles initially were not up to Coca-
Cola’s standards. Finding a supplier to make Coca-Cola’s icon contour bottle was a challenge, but 
eventually, a local supplier was secured.  
4.3. Lessons learned from Coca-Cola’s experience 
Why was Coca-Cola successful while others we not? The key success factors were their 
short-term advantages and long-term strategies. In the short term, Coca-Cola received a substantial 
two-year tax exemption from the Russian government which held down costs while Coca-Cola’s 
strategies were being formulated and implemented. One of Coca-Cola’s key strategies that they 
implemented as soon as possible was to localize production. Whereas other American companies, 
such as IBM, set up an assembly plant that remained vulnerable to import duties and tariffs, Coca-
Cola decided to localize its supply chain. Having flexible local suppliers was the key to reducing 
the risks of increased taxes and import tariffs.  
To avoid corruption problems, Coca-Cola carefully chose its business partners and 
worked only with ones who are not engaged in any questionable practices. Furthermore, its 
employees were trained according to the company’s code of conduct which is known to be stricter 
than the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  
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The incredible success of Coca-Cola is evident to anyone in Russia today. The company 
employs over 3500 local workers, including prominent managers who form the core leadership for 
the company’s future growth and expansion. Coca-Cola has always paid close attention to hiring 
and retaining top talent. In part because of its highly trained personnel, it has quickly achieved 
market leadership in Moscow and St. Petersburg.  
Coca-Cola’s experience in Russia highlights the strategies and tactics that improve the 
chances for success for a company making a direct investment in Russia. It was crucial for Coca-
Cola to establish a market-oriented and customer-driven supply chain in a country that previously 
lived under a command system with production quotas. Coca-Cola recognized that Russians knew 
relatively little about marketing, production efficiency, and consistently high quality. On this 
score, Coca-Cola was a key market player in the transition to capitalism. 
To summarize, Coca-Cola proceeded deliberately but quickly to overcome significant 
obstacles when it entered the Russian market. Its key success tactics included localizing 
production, establishing reliable supply chains, finding the best possible labor, and working closely 
with federal and local authorities on taxes, land and other potential problems. Most importantly, 
Coca-Cola operated with integrity in all circumstances.  
4.4. Other successful American companies in Russia 
Another US-based company, ice cream maker Ben and Jerry’s, has also been extremely 
successful in the Russian marketplace. The company, known for its proactive charity practices, 
first considered opening a store in Russia in 1987 during President Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
perestroika reforms. Three years before opening its first store, the company formed a joint venture 
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to open an ice cream factory and parlor in Petrozavodsk, 175 miles from St. Petersburg. “We 
quickly learned that to do business here, you cannot just have Plan A and Plan B. You will need 
Plan C, D, E, F, and G,” said Greg Quinn, general director of Ben and Jerry’s Russian operation 
(Knobel, 1993). “You have to expect things not to go right and then be flexible to take advantage 
of it.” It took several years to find reliable suppliers of ingredients and locations for its café-
factories concept. The first retail store was opened in July of 1992. According to Quinn, the major 
problems they encountered were undeveloped infrastructure and the lengthy process of finding 
dependable supply sources. Despite the challenges, their hard work is paying off. The business is 
turning a profit; furthermore, their rapid growth has allowed them to expand into sales of pre-
packaged pints and even multi-gallon tubs of ice cream in Moscow and St. Petersburg.  
Ben and Jerry’s, like most other foreign companies in Russia, pays in rubles for the 
ingredients, equipment, and employees’ salaries. The profits are wired back home. They use the 
simple mechanism of buying dollars at Russian banks and then wiring them to the U.S. Therefore, 
repatriating profits was not among the obstacles that they faced doing business in Russia. Other 
barriers they faced, however, according to Ben and Jerry’s executives, are a lack of basic business 
laws and finding partners you can trust. One piece of advice they give is to have an incredible 
amount of patience because it takes much longer than anticipated to start making a profit. 
Caterpillar is also among U.S. companies with a significant presence in the Russian 
market. Caterpillar’s history in Russia began in May 1913 when Holt Caterpillar exhibited at the 
St. Petersburg Auto Show. The Auto Show was set up to celebrate the 300th anniversary of the 
dynasty of the Romanovs and Holt Caterpillar won all first-prize gold medals during the contest. 
Since then, Caterpillar equipment has been an inevitable component of the Russian industrial 
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landscape. According to CEO Doug Oberhelman, Caterpillar’s presence in Russia today is larger 
than ever, with 700 employees and five offices in Russia and Kazakhstan, and a fully-owned 
Caterpillar Greenfield facility in Tosno, a small town near St. Petersburg. Moreover, Caterpillar’s 
20 dealers employ approximately 5,400 people who are responsible for delivering equipment and 
services to the most distant parts of the country. There are approximately 27,000 Caterpillar 
machines and 14,000 units of power systems equipment in Russia today. The Group President, Stu 
Levenick, claimed that their success in the Euro-Asian market would not be possible without the 
reputation of the best lifetime value. He emphasized the importance of the long-term customer-
oriented business activities that ultimately enabled them to gain a substantial market share. The 
company has been making large investments in this growing market and intends to continue doing 
so. 
Another American company, Marco, on the other hand, has not been as successful as Ben 
and Jerry’s or Caterpillar. Marco was started in 1991 by a group of private investors from St. Louis 
and Kansas City who saw a big potential in exporting Russian lumber. According to Bartow Shaw, 
one of the key investors, they wanted to help bring Russia back into the mainstream of the world 
economy (Knobel, 1993). Karelia, a Russian region stretching along the Finnish border, had an 
abundance of lush forests of pine and birch, with one lake for every five residents. At first, the 
local government seemed supportive. It even undertook substantial steps to encourage foreign 
investment. However, the local authorities were particularly sensitive about industries involving 
natural resources. Because Russian laws favor joint ventures - and give them tax exemptions and 
favorable export quotas - Marco began a search for partners. The search was challenging. Indeed, 
potential candidates bargained so hard that Marco’s top management eventually decided to not to 
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form a joint venture but remain solely a U.S.-owned company. As a U.S.-owned company, 
however, Marco could not get permission from government officials to export some of their 
products, such as cut lumber boards. They have compensated by moving into products that they 
















As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, any Western company considering entering 
the Russian marketplace should realize that it is moving into a unique environment that has risks 
not necessarily found in other markets.  These risks cannot be avoided, but by rigorous analysis of 
the marketplace and adopting appropriate strategies and plans, the risks can be reduced.  The 
following recommendations are presented to assist any Western companies considering doing 
business in Russia in facing the challenges and risks they will experience. 
5.1. Do your homework and determine whether the Russian market is a good fit 
for your company given the differences in culture and business ethics 
Because companies are often attracted by the unusual opportunities and huge potential 
profits available in Russia, they frequently underestimate the so-called liability of foreignness 
(Rothaermel, 2013).  This liability of foreignness includes the costs of doing business across 
national borders in an unfamiliar cultural and economic environment.  For the reasons discussed 
above in this paper, any company considering entering the Russian marketplace should first 
consider whether that market is a good fit for the company given the cultural, workforce, 
infrastructure and legal differences they will encounter.  It is far better for a company to decide up 
front that Russia is not a good fit rather than to reach that conclusion after several years of failed 
operations and the expenditure of considerable capital.   
5.2. Plan your action before you enter the marketplace 
Even if a company determines that Russia can be a good fit, it is critical that the company 
develop appropriate strategies and implementation plans (with alternate plans also ready to be 
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implemented) to achieve their objectives.  The strategies should take into account: (i) actual or 
potential political instability; (ii) a lack of infrastructure or inadequate infrastructure; (iii)  vague 
or inadequate laws and legal system; a dispute resolution mechanism such as arbitration should be 
considered in all contracts; (iv) availability of supplies and raw materials; (v) underdeveloped 
financial markets and institutions; (vi) possible lack of suitably experienced Russian partners for 
the business; (vii) a plan for repatriating profits earned in Russia; (viii) work force issues – how 
you will acquire, train and retain a capable workforce, including managers; (ix) how the company 
will avoid or deal with issues of corruption and bribery, keeping in mind the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act or its equivalent in other Western countries; and (x) any other issues unique to the 
particular business the company is in.  
5.3. Be ready to invest more capital and time than anticipated 
There is a significant cost of doing business in Russia, and the required investment is not 
only for equipment. Recruiting and retaining top talent will require substantial amount of financial 
resources and time. Given that the workforce issues are among the top obstacles when operating 
in Russia, it is not surprising that extensive training and customized training programs will be 
advantageous, particularly in the service industries which are generally known to be labor 
intensive. 
The research also suggests that the entire process of entering the marketplace in any given 
industry usually takes longer than anticipated due to the bureaucratic structure. Every decision has 




5.4. Spend significant time developing relationships with those with 
power and   influence 
“Greasing the wheels” prior to entering Russian market is critical in order to establish 
amicable relationships with authorities and those who are in charge of the decision-making 
process. As previously discussed, formal and informal networks play an important role in 
conducting business in Russia. It would be helpful to establish a reliable network to ensure 
collaborative partnership while conducting business in Russia. The folk saying “It is not what you 
know, it is who you know” particularly holds true for Russians. 
 5.5. Send the right people to Russia 
It is especially important to select carefully the expatriates to make sure they have not 
only their professional expertise, but also communication skills, a willingness to go “the extra 
mile”, and the ability to teach and learn from others. The goal is to send people who have the 
necessary talent to execute a business strategy and are capable of adjusting to the host country’s 
cultural standards, and who can educate locals about American core competencies and procedures. 
The research indicates that in some cases American managers sent to Russia to introduce new 
organizational culture simply vanish into the ocean of resistance (Puffer, 1996). Others are 
indifferent and do not even try to change anything. They perform their operational functions, but 
they do not educate Russian employees to work in compliance with a company’s standards. As 
one of the expatriates explicitly expressed it: “I am here to do my job, not to teach others to do 
theirs. I am not getting paid for that.” (Puffer, 1996, p. 245). Clearly, not many experienced 
business managers are willing to relocate to Russia; therefore, companies’ executives tend to send 
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younger managers who often do not yet have appropriate skills and experience to introduce a new 
business culture and management style in Russia. Nevertheless, the research suggests that by 
providing language and cultural training for Russian employees, companies managed to increase 















Despite the opportunities Russia presents to a company looking for a significant new 
market and huge potential profits in the long run, Russia also presents formidable challenges and 
risks to any Western or American company considering doing business in Russia.  Russia’s unique 
and sometimes tragic history has influenced the business environment and the ethical standards of 
the workforce.  When that is combined with sub-par infrastructure, weak adherence to the rule of 
law and inadequate legal protections, and potential shortages of adequate supplies and raw 
materials, among other challenges, any Western or American company must carefully weigh 
whether the challenges and risks are worth the potential rewards.  What is clear, however, is that 
some companies, such as Coca-Cola, have successfully navigated all the challenges and have 
reaped the rewards that are available to a successful company in Russia.  Moreover, Coca-Cola 
has achieved success without compromising its ethical standards, which means that other 
companies can do the same.  However, any company wishing to join the successful Western and 
American companies doing business in Russia must have plenty of capital and lots of patience.  If 
those companies consider the risks described in this paper and follow the recommendations 
provided above they will reduce the risks they face and enhance the chances of a successful entry 
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